Top Five Astros |
Ensberg |
0.518 |
Palmeiro |
0.279 |
Ausmus |
0.240 |
Bruntlett |
0.154 |
Springer |
0.119 |
|
|
Bottom Five Astros |
Vizcaino |
-0.053 |
Chavez |
-0.122 |
Qualls |
-0.151 |
Taveras |
-0.156 |
Astacio |
-0.281 |
|
|
Top Three Cards |
Edmonds |
0.599 |
Mulder |
0.332 |
Eldred |
0.284 |
|
If any game cried out to have the graphical interpretation performed upon it, it was last night's classic. The wild swings in momentum produce long, dramatic lines with large slopes.
Very pretty, indeed.
Couple things I've noted:
- When Berkman was walked intentionally in the eleventh after Biggio's double, it was a move that slightly increased the Cards' chance of winning, and Isringhausen took some slight numerical credit for it. But it also penalized Berkman, .005, I think it was. That's not right . . .
- Of course, the software can't deal with the way the Astros were hosed on Chavez' comebacker to Tavarez, but it also can't deal with the incredible hustle the backup catcher showed going from first to third on Lane's single. Let's face it: Chavez is not fast, but he got it done, and that ends up being a critical play in the game. So the software's got him as one of the Bottom Five, but that's also just plain wrong.
- LaRussa did us a BIG favor by walking Viz after the Lane single. The WPA thang says it increased our chances of winning from .460 to something like .530. And you can see why. Dierker mentioned it last night: a walk or an HBP will force home the tying run. Now, why do you wanna create that situation for the only marginally valuable effect of creating a force at third? Some genius, more of a dumbass, if you think about it.
- See that Jim Edmonds did more to help his team win than anybody on the winning team . . .he destroys us, always.