Normalized Strikeouts vs. Normalized Total Bases
So, Aubrey Huff is the man for the productive out.
Having already accomplished the walkoff groundout, our somewhat disappointing midseason acquisition did it again on Friday night.
With one out, the score tied and the amazingly clutch OP on second, Huff took an anemic hack, hit the ball all of 75 feet, and was out by six steps.
Not too good, except that the weak grounder he hit was in the direction of the first baseman, and enabled OP to take third. It was in fact, pretty darned good overall, and one of my keys to a game that had many.
I don't think you can overstate the importance of hitting the ball to the right side in that situation, and I don't think you can understate the damage a K there would have done.
Now, fairness compels me to state that the WPA contraption does not see a big difference between a man on second and a man on third with two outs there. And it says that the play cost us a little over 70 points of win probability.

But I say that's bullshit.
Look how many new ways for the Astros to win were opened up after Aubrey got Palmeiro over: A wild pitch. A passed ball. An error in the infield. A short single to left. A balk.
Sure Huff could have struck out and then Biggio could have doubled. Or Biggio could have gone 3 - 2 and THEN singled. Or OP could have taken third on a throw that escaped Molina, and then scored on Biggio's single. Hell, Biggio could have singled to the opposite field.
Or Junction Jack could have homered off the Conoco Pump.
But most likely, a Huff strikeout forces the Astros to get an extra base hit, or back-to-back singles. And that would have materially reduced the Astros' chances, in a big way, whatever the software says.
Alright. It wasn't my intention to argue with the Win Probability numbers when I started writing this. I assumed that they'd show what I thought to be intuitive. So I had to take a detour, and pardons.
But, yeah, my thinking after that whole sequence reinforced the bias I usually bring to the table: that strikeouts DO suck and that many times, being able to put the ball in play brings a distinct advantage. No matter what your basic Adam Dunn enthusiast might say.
In fact, I thought, probably going overboad in the full flush of a thrilling victory, perhaps the whole game can be reduced to the goal of reducing strikeouts while maximizing total bases.
It kinda made sense. Total bases and strikeouts are perhaps inversely related; freaks like Adam Dunn and Wade Boggs, instead of being outliers, are instead part of a main sequence, if you will, that expresses that relationship.
Well it sounded good. Having done the work, I see that at a certain point strikeouts become so frequent that they limit additional extra bases. There probably is no "main sequence," just a clump of hitters in the middle, and then some guys who rack up the whiffs or the extra bases at the edges.
Still, the graph I made is kind of pretty. First thing I knew is that I'd have to normalize the data, so the tendencies of someone like Biggio--with 10,000 at bats--could be fairly compared to someone like Jason Lane, with 1,000. So I didn't compare strikeouts and total bases, I compared strikeouts per 1000 at bats with total bases per 1000 at bats.
At first, I set a lower limit of 500 at bats, but that only provided me with a little over a 100 players, so I dropped it to 300 at bats, and that gave me 150 hitters that fit the bill, more or less, all time.
I got them all to fit, barely. I went ahead and colored the current players in red, and got this:

For example, knowing as we do that Moises Alou holds the team record for highest career batting average, doesn't his data point in the lower right hand corner of the graph mean he's the greatest hitter in team history, regardless of tenure?
And you may not see an easier way to compare the relative merits of Jeff Kent, Jeff Bagwell and Lance Berkman this year.
Immediately upon finishing this, it occurred to me that other scatter graphs of this sort might be illuminating. RBI chances converted vs. strikeouts is the one I wanna do now, maybe you can think of others. . . . .
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WPA Contraption
correct...
Thank You
Although I apologize if I seem, or am, overwrought. I'm kind of high strung, anyway, and was a little frustrated perhaps when the data gave me a detour in my planned post. . . .
At any rate, my concern is not that Huff's out is interpreted by the algorithm to have cost the team WPA, but rather that it did not highlight the difference in situation between his moving the runner over and not doing so with theout he made.
As I'd highlighted, it showed a 1.9% difference in the Astros WPA there between runner on second with two out and runner on third with two out.
That number's too low. As I was saying, "Look how many new ways for the Astros to win were opened up after Aubrey got Palmeiro over: A wild pitch. A passed ball. An error in the infield. A short single to left. A balk."
Last year in roughly 100,000 plate appearances in the NL, 745 wildpitches were thrown, and another 149 passed balls were committed. So if the 1.9 is correct, and so is my logic, .89 of it is due solely to the wild pitch and the passed ball.
But also last year, 977 plate appearances of the 99,500 or so ended with a runner reached on an error. This is another .98% or 1.87 of that 1.9 total--and we haven't even considered the largest subclass of ways to win that game with the runner on third, and the one that actually DID win it, the single to left.
The league hit 15,250-some odd singles last year in those 99,500 plate appearances. 15.3% of all plate appearances thus ended with a single.
How many of them were short to the left side? I have no idea. 1/3 of them? Whatever, that percentage is is the amount by which the WPA is understating Huff's contribution.
Plus whatever would be contributed by the balk which I've ignored here, and anything else I just haven't thought of.
Again, I appreciate your having come by to comment and I would like to express my appreciation for the WPA system that I am a huge fan of, that gives the fan a whole new toolset, but I think that the point I am making is valid.
Overwrought perhaps, but valid.
by rastronomicals on Sep 26, 2006 9:40 AM CDT up reply actions
No problem
Thanks for the compliments. I've posted my own comments here...
http://www.baseballgraphs.com/main/index.php/site/article/the_win_expectancy_contraption/
...showing the results of the actual data. Not that different, on an absolute basis, from the "contraption."
I don't understand how you're applying the frequency of events to WPA logic. For one thing, you're assuming errors, wild pitches and passed balls occur as often with a man on third, tying run and two out. They clearly don't.
You know, this isn't really that hard. Take a look at an actual run expectancy matrix:
http://www.tangotiger.net/RE9902score.html
That shows the chances of scoring 0 runs with a man on second and two outs is 78%. With a man on third and two outs, it's .74%. It's based on actual data from 1999-2002. If you want to claim that the WPA contraption is wrong because it should be 4% instead of 2%, I can agree with that. But it's not wildly wrong.
Hmmm
you're assuming errors, wild pitches and passed balls occur as often with a man on third, tying run and two out.
I, to be honest, didn't consider that they WOULDN'T be the same, since they are not planned events. A pitcher either makes a mistake or he doesn't, the pitch slips out of his hand and goes to the backstop or doesn't, the shortstop airmails it or he doesn't, seems like . . . at least at first.
Might be these event occur less often with the man on third two outs situation, but I'd be interested in data that showed it was clearly so.
But if it IS true that pitchers and fielders limit errors with runners on third, that could indeed be the root of the discrepancy that is causing me so much grief. Yes, a short single can score the runner, and yes, a wild pitch or passed ball or an error can, where they wouldn't have with the guy on second. But with a man on third, defensive teams so successfully limit their mistakes that the additional WPA added by that single is annulled, even reversed.
Well, I'm not convinced, but I remain receptive.
by rastronomicals on Sep 26, 2006 11:33 AM CDT up reply actions
Rebuttal
http://www.insidethebook.com/ee/index.php/site/article/misunderstanding_win_expectancy/

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