I don’t totally agree with Cameron’s article. He makes it seem like advanced fielding metrics are persuading baseball teams to do what their scouts have always wanted them to do (acquire good defensive players). One of the consequence of advanced defensive metrics is that they have identified defensive players who are either better or worse than the evaluations made by scouts. Jeter is a good example, since his fielding has always been more highly rated by scouts than UZR or PMR, etc. (The Astros amateur scout who discovered Jeter predicted that he would become one of the greatest fielding shortstops in history.) The Royals’ shortstop Yuniesky has always been liked by scouts but hated by defensive metrics. It tells you something about the Royals that they ignored the fielding metrics and traded for him based on his reputation among scouts. (It also tells you how much the advanced metrics have been adopted that the Royals’ move was widely derided by fans and the media.) Roger Cedeno? Scouts loved his defense but advanced metrics hated him? Who was right? (To some extent, I think scouts fall in love with “tools,” like speed, but sometimes miss the actual outcomes.) UZR may tell us that Hunter Pence is a much better defender and arm in RF than scouts give him credit. Some guys like Pence or Nick Swisher don’t “look” like good defenders or throwers to scouts, but UZR tells us that they get the job done their own way. One of the advantages of advanced defensive metrics is that they evaluate every play, but scouts only see a sample of the plays.

We are seeing two divergent trends, I think. The Blue Jays’ new GM has decided to go the other way and beef up scouting. He wants more and better scouts than anybody in baseball. He thinks this is the new market advantage. That’s interesting, and maybe it makes sense for amateur scouting, but I am skeptical of this approach to professional player scouting. On the other hand, some organizations may begin an opposite path. The Rays were among the small number of teams to eliminate advance scouts in favor of quality control coaches who perform more sophisiticated analysis of video of upcoming teams. I’m sure lower costs was a motivation, but it also represented a view that video analysis can be more powerful than in person scouting.

Maybe one advantage held by scouts is their ability to evaluate the personality, mentality, and other “intangibles” of the players. This is what the Astros’ scout raved about Jeter. It’s what the Astros like about Jiovanny Mier. Unlike all of us at home, the scouts can meet the players, talk to their coaches and teammates, etc. The stat community tends to look down their nose at “intangibles,” but I don’t think that it is a non-existent factor, even if it is unmeasurable.

Davoag (and clack) make sense for the relatively small and known professional group; and maybe for major colleges. I don’t see how extensive defensive data can be acquired on high school players, even on most high profile high school players. They don’t play enough games .The competition is not as demanding or fast, etc. I think for them scouts on the ground listening to contacts and others who’ve watched the player develop and play will continue to be the premier scouting tool.

You’re obviously not going to get discussion on many of them. I think you’re wrong about a whole lot and it’d be a whole lot of work to discuss so many things. I’ll just throw out a few with no thought of an overall response or linking them coherently.

• It defies logic to say that the Texans should get a pro-bowler because they have an innovative offense

• Getting on base is a fundamental part of baseball, but teams were not paying guys who possessed that skill. Yet, for some reason, this set off a firestorm of “stats vs. scouting” debates around baseball that still lingers to this day. Why is that?

  
  I’ve only read sections and commentary, but isn’t the book’s message much broader than your statement. Prince Fielder’s OBP was .412 last year (and he slugged .600) and drafting him was a source of great amusement to Beane and company. FWIW, teams paid guys for that skill. The idea is that generally it wasn’t valued as highly as its real value. There is a story line to the book. That doesn’t mean it defines history.

• Not all [defensive statistics] work, but there are plenty of smart people working on it. More than any time this decade, there are plenty of concrete, statistical ways to determine who’s a good defensive player and who is a bad one, with a fair degree of accuracy.

  
  There are really 2 types of metrics to measure defense, zone systems and plus/minus systems that have been around for a while. I suppose you can argue that they are “concrete” because they exist in written form, but I think that’s a misuse of the term and their existence doesn’t make them “good.” Praising them because smart people are working on them (and often promoting them in their own self interest) is folly of great magnitude. Forgive me but i think its sad/humorous when people are waxing on about the joy and power of “advanced” statistics and throw out statements like UZR or whatever works with a “fair degree of accuracy” when it isn’t tested in any scientific way. Is it even tested at all?

• I’d guess that scouts typically have more than 7 years of experience before they ever scout.

• Have you ever had a significant medical procedure or been intimately involved with someone who did? You’ll learn more about medical shit than you ever wanted to know. Will Carroll is a reporter. I don’t think he has any medical training at all. In short, be careful of assumptions.

• I’d guess your estimate of how much baseball a scout watches is erroneous. Additionally they do interpersonal work with players, coaches and families.

• You have certainty that the Cards and Mariners are thinking outside the box. What is the source of that certainty? I haven’t read a single thing about Jack Z that suggests he is doing anything differently than he did with the Brewers who have been mocked forever for their backwardness. It looks like the Cards are going to sign a very good outfielder to a jumbo long term contract. As a fan of an opposing team, I like that.

• The volume of data is so great that it allows accurate conclusions to be drawn. That’s my impression of several of your comments. If you look outside of baseball to economics, science and social science, there are debates that go on for decades which are fueled by statistical evaluation where the volume of data is far greater and far more reliable than garbage like “velocity” data that is a guy checking whether he thought a hit was hard, medium or soft. Sometimes the debates involve interested parties like political advocacy. An example is the publishing of the book The Bell Curve. Sometimes its disinterested parties like the debate over the primary cause of the main group of stomach ulcers. Ever watch an old 50s movie and guys with ulcers drink milk? That’s because the overwhelming opinion, supported by advanced statistical research was that excess acid was the cause.

• Is there a logical difference between “sabermetrics” and scouting? Yes, they are two different things. Teams and scouts have used statistics forever. Just defining sabermetrics is a discussion in and of itself.