Some thoughts on the Astros efficiency in 2009
***Now featuring an attempted answer by me***
What would your response be if I told you that in 2009, there was only one team that was more efficient in MLB than the Astros? Since that was rhetorical, I'll answer what I assume: WTF?!
But it's true. Kind of. More like, sort of—actually.
According to the Bill James Handbook—which the kind folks at Acta Sports sent my way—I've had the opportunity to mull over the surplus of entertaining stats, charts, tables, and graphs that pack that pages of the Handbook (they'll likely be the fodder for about three months worth of posting...just warning you). While I've come across a couple of truly interesting things, the team efficiency scores have had me scratching my head for a few days now.
James' Team Efficiency measure is a combination of a couple different scaled scores based on hitting efficiency (basically our RC's created compared to RS), pitching efficiency (basically our PRC compared to RA), and our Pythag-differential. To quote James himself on this measure:
Teams bounce up and down these rankings, and there is a lot of pure luck which is included under the heading "efficiency" (10).
So basically it's this massive aggregator of macro-data that requires sifting through. This works well for us because we're just the people do that for the Astros.
Here's how the separate efficiency scores that comprise team efficiency played out (100 is average):
- Hitting Efficiency: 96
- Pitching Efficiency: 101
- Runs Efficiency: 111
- Overall Efficiency: 106
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By “run efficiency” I assume you mean outperforming the Pythagorean Record. (Hardball Times does list one NL team with a better Pythag overperformance than the Astros: the Padres.)
Just a cursory glance at the Hardball Times’ close games records would indicate a relationship between records in close games and Pythag differential. If one were looking at overperforming in close games, I would compare the actual record in close games to what the record would have been in close games if the winning % was equal to the team’s overall winning %. Call this “close vs. expected.”
Astros +6 Pythag Variance +4 Close Games +5.2 Close vs. Expected
Mariners +10 Pythag Variance + 16 Close Games +5.8 Close vs. Expected
Padres +8 Pythag Variance + 9 Close Games +7.2 Close vs.Expected
Among the top overperforming Pythag teams, the close vs. expected margin accounts for a large proportion of the Pythag variance.
As I have said previously, I think studying the Angels would yield some information on some team construction factors which lead to pythag overperformance. I say this because the Angels are the serial Pythag overperformers, having overperformed Pythag for something like 7 consecutive years, if I recall. When I get a chance, I will post some more on this subject, because it always intrigues me.
But I think the numbers indicate that we should be looking at factors which affect close game performance if we want to explain the Astros, Padres, and Mariners performance.
by clack on Nov 4, 2009 8:57 AM CST reply actions 0 recs
I left off the other team which outperformed its Pythag more than the Astros, the Yankees. (Again, this is based on HT’s team stats page.)
Yankees +7 Pythag +23 Close Games + 1.6 Close vs. Expected.
by clack on Nov 4, 2009 9:17 AM CST up reply actions 0 recs
Okay, I was a history major, so help walk me through this one.
If the Astros were above average in Run Efficiency, does that mean they were great at scoring runs, or just great at converting whatever scoring opportunities they had into runs? In that case, they may have had 200 less opportunities than, say, they Cubs, but managed to convert a higher percentage into actual runs, which means they were more efficient, but not more prolific. Does that make sense?
I understand the pythag records and all that, it’s just the efficiency bit that gives me pause. What are we really looking at here?
by David Coleman on Nov 4, 2009 9:30 AM CST reply actions 0 recs
From my understanding
It’s that they were great at converting their produced runs into wins, given their run differential. So it’s basically like saying they were great at outpacing their pythag record.
The Crawfishboxes
A good friend of mine used to say, "This is a very simple game. You throw the ball, you catch the ball, you hit the ball. Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose, sometimes it rains." Think about that for a while.
by Stephen Higdon on Nov 4, 2009 9:36 AM CST up reply actions 0 recs
Which makes more sense, esp. when added to the numbers clack posted above.
by David Coleman on Nov 4, 2009 9:42 AM CST up reply actions 0 recs
I thought I had read some where that the Astros last season were highly productive with the outs they made, and I wonder if that could be a factor.
by timmy_ on Nov 4, 2009 3:00 PM CST up reply actions 0 recs
Which is interesting, given all the criticism we leveled this season about Coop wasting outs on things like sac bunts and improperly giving the green light to baserunners.
by AstroAndy on Nov 4, 2009 3:04 PM CST up reply actions 0 recs
"productive outs" is defined differently.
B-Ref has a stat called “productive outs” (developed by Elias). Based on productive outs per opportunity, the Astros are tied (with Atlanta) for the highest rate (35%). Productive outs are defined as sacrifices by the pitcher, advancing a runner with no outs, and a RBI on an out with 1 out in the inning. To some extent I think the Astros’ success with this stat is based on the high groundball rates of the hitters (which also gives the Astros the highest GIDP rate). However, we should also give credit to hitters like Tejada and Lee who are willing to get their RBIs with groundballs to the right side of the infield.
I don’t think this is reflective of Cooper’s use of sacrifice bunts. The Astros were below the league average in sac bunt attempts and just about league average in sac bunt success rate.
by clack on Nov 4, 2009 6:02 PM CST up reply actions 0 recs
More on productive outs....
Miguel Tejada led the Astros in productive outs, with 27, which was good for 6th in the NL. Kaz Matsui was next with 23, which ranked him 16th in the NL. Miguel Tejada was 7th in the NL in advancing the runner home from 3d base with less than 2 outs. Tejada’s rate for advancing the runner in that situation was an astounding 69%. I don’t think any player with a similar large number of opportunities had a rate that high. Carlos Lee was 16th in the NL in bringing the runner home from 3d base with less than 2 outs. (His rate was a very good 57%.) Obviously, both Lee and Tejada made good use of both the Sac Fly and the productive ground out in those situations.
The Astros as a team were 4th in the NL in the rate of advancing the runner home from 3d base with less than 2 outs. That’s the good news. The bad news is that the Astros were dead last in the NL in opportunities with the runner on 3d base with less than 2 outs. The Astros executed very well in that situation, but they just couldn’t get the runner onto third base in that situation very often—-whether it’s due to poor OBP or poor X-bases or both.
by clack on Nov 4, 2009 9:31 PM CST up reply actions 0 recs
We’ve talked a lot about GIDPs this season, but supposedly the ability to get productive outs by putting the ball in play counterbalances the extra outs from the double play ball. In other words, it definitely is good not to strike out, as an isolated attribute, although getting on base is more important overall.
by OremLK on Nov 5, 2009 2:07 AM CST up reply actions 0 recs
I think you are correct that the productive outs offset somewhat the GIDP damage by good contact hitters like Lee and Tejada. But it doesn’t wholly offset the impact of GIDPs—losing a base runner has more value than advancing a base runner…plus the GIDPs are more numerous. I wouldn’t say that strike outs are good (all outs are bad), but I do think that it is helpful to have a more balanced lineup (than the Astros) in terms of contact vs. 3 true outcome hitters. The Astros seemed to reach some kind of critical mass in GIDP proclivity and losing base runners last year.
However, looking at these numbers reminds me how valuable Tejada was as a hitter. It would be nice if the Astros could somehow bring Tejada back next year.
by clack on Nov 5, 2009 7:32 AM CST up reply actions 0 recs
Something that I should have added in the article
The Astros, in 2009, were better in Medium and High leverage situations than in low leverage by a fairly decent amount too. So it seems, to me, that they managed to make some their RS count for a lot more than just the raw number would indicate. They posted their highest OBP in high leverage situations.
The Crawfishboxes
A good friend of mine used to say, "This is a very simple game. You throw the ball, you catch the ball, you hit the ball. Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose, sometimes it rains." Think about that for a while.
by Stephen Higdon on Nov 4, 2009 9:50 AM CST reply actions 0 recs
Yes....I think the Astros' hitting w/RISP could be a partial explanation.
If you assume that batting average with runners in scoring position is most beneficial in close games, but less important in blow out games, that could provide a linkage to overperforming Pythag.
Some examples of clutch hitting (ranking= ranking within league):
Astros RISP 4th, RISPw/2outs 4th, Bases Loaded 6th, 7th inning+ 4th
These clutch hitting rankings are significantly better than the Astros overall ranking in hitting (8th). However, this same pattern of clutch hitting doesn’t hold true for the Mariners, Yankees, and Padres, which also overperformed their pythagorean. Maybe this helps explains how the Astros were good in close games, but those teams got there differently.
Last year we talked about Valverde and the closer as a factor in overperforming the Pythag. Maybe we can extend that to late inning reliever performance, since Valverde was joined by Arias, Sampson, and Hawkins with good late inning pitching. League rankings for ERA in 7th inning or later:
Astros 5th; Padres 3d; Mariners 4th; Yankees 3d.
With the exception of the Mariners, all of these late inning ERA performances are substantially better than the teams’ overall ERA ranking. And it’s not hard to believe a cause-effect link between winning close games and late inning relief pitching.
For what it’s worth, the Astros’ pitchers step up their strike outs with RISP and RISP w/2outs. The Astros pitchers are 9th in the NL in Ks, but 4th and 5th with RISP-2outs and RISP, respectively. I’m not sure whether this is a good measure of clutch pitching, but I’ll throw it out there.
by clack on Nov 4, 2009 11:10 AM CST up reply actions 0 recs
Thinking about the LA Angels...
Picking up my earlier statement about the serial overperformers, the Angels. I find it interesting that Ed Wade said he wanted to construct an offense like the Angels when he first came to the Astros. Some typical characteristics of Angels’ teams: high batting average, high contact hitters; good base running and speed; high batting average with RISP. Typically the Angels are near the bottom of the AL in HR ranking, even though they were much better at hitting HRs this year. Despite the analysts who who view clutch hitting as a random variable, the Angels have consistently hit well with RISP in recent years. (Each year, we see some sabermetric writer predict a collapse by the Angels because their success is driven by “fluke” clutch hitting..but it never happens. The Angels are No. 1 in the majors in hitting with RISP this year.)
Now I’m definitely in the realm of hypothesis, rather than proof or conclusions. Maybe teams predicated on contact hitting, high batting averages, and batting averages w/RISP, but relatively low power, can overperform Pythag, because these characteristics are more beneficial in close games, but tend to produce few blow out wins.
by clack on Nov 4, 2009 11:31 AM CST reply actions 0 recs

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